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The Background
Traditional, pre-colonial use of wildlife resources in Zimbabwe and the history of the 
evolution of policies and practices regarding wildlife in Zimbabwe’s communal lands2 
during the colonial period are not discussed in any detail in this chapter. Broadly 
speaking, the picture is one of a pre-coldnial past in which human populations at far 
lower population densities than currently prevail managed wildlife resources through 
localised regimes of communal proprietorship. Utilisation was largely for local 
consumption, although the commercial exploitation of ivory has a long pre-colonial 
history in the area. In the second half of the nineteenth century this commercial 
exploitation of the elephant population assumed different and larger dimensions and 
became a factor in the colonial intrusions which crystallised in settler occupation in 1890. 
The processes mentioned above also had important effects on wildlife densities and 
distribution. Along the main watershed and in most of the country designated as Natural 
Regions I - III most (but not all) species suffered sharp declines in population densities. 
In Natural Regions IV and V, and particularly Natural Region V (27% of total land 
surface) certain species have increased in numbers. These include, importantly in 
respect to the safari industry, buffalo and elephant. In some cases this increase has 
been dramatic: Zimbabwe today has more than 50,000 elephant as contrasted to an 
estimated 10,000 at the turn of the century3.
Natural Region V is characterised by areas of low and erratic rainfall, high temperatures, 
generally infertile soils and often rough terrajn. These areas are also generally on the 
periphery of Zimbabwe’s transport and energy networks, lying in the Sough-East 
Lowveld, large tracts of Matabeleland and the Zambezi Valley. Of its 104,400 square 
kilometres of land, 45% is communal land, 35% is large scale commercial ranch land 
and 20% National Estate, this being comprised of national parks, safari areas under the 
control of the Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management (NPWM), and 
forest land. Commercial exploitation of the wildlife resources in Natural Region V, which 
holds the core of Zimbabwe's wildlife assets, only seriously commenced in the late 
1960’s with ventures by commercial ranches in game cropping. Shortly thereafter, the 
impact of the boom in the international safari business manifested itself and commercial 
activities shifted largely to this mode of exploitation, hunting safaris being conducted in 
safari areas under the National Parks estate, on commercial ranches and on 
concessions allocated by NPWM in communal lands. The industry has experienced 
steady expansion through the 1970s and 1980s, yielding in 1987 an estimated direct 
revenue of ZWD 10 million (ten million Zimbabwe dollars), most of it in foreign currency4. 
While, in terms of the national budget, this is a relatively small amount, its foreign 
currency - or export component - makes it important for national policy. Also important is 
the fact that the safari industry provides an international market for Zimbabwe in which
2 Previously termed at various stages in Zimbabwe's colonial history “Native Reserves” and 'Tribal 
Trust Lands”.
3 This in spite of heavy culling carried out to effect ecological balances between elephant 
populations and vegetation cover. A number of soft-skinned species suffered significant declines 
in the 1950s and 1960s as a result of game-clearing operations to control the spread of tsetse fly.
4 To this statistic must be added the value of wildlife to Zimbabwe's tourist and hotel industry, 
revenues from game cropping, the farming of certain species such as crocodile, and protein 
inputs to local diets. The Minister of Natural Resources and Tourism suggested, in a speech to 
Parliament in 1987, that total direct and indirect revenues from wildlife were in the region of two 
hundred million Zimbabwe dollars.
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its competitors are relatively few and in which supply projections are limited, unlike 
commodity markets'for beef, cotton and grains.
To encourage game cropping and the Country's entry into the international safari market, 
the Parks and Wildlife Act was enacted in 1975, a specific objective being “to confer 
privileges on owners or occupiers of alienated land as custodians of wildlife." 
(Zimbabwe, 1975: 5). This Act was a significant departure from the "King's Game" 
concept, the insight being that efficient and sustainable regimes of wildlife utilisation 
were likely to be enhanced by local proprietorship. As the quote implies, the Act was 
directed largely at commercial farmers, but it contains a provision enabling the Minister 
to designate district councils in communal lands as "appropriate authorities" for the 
management of wildlife on lands under their jurisdiction, analogous to the 
"custodianship" of wildlife- conferred on owners or occupiers of alienated land. 
(Zimbabwe, 1975: 12, 66-67). Few if any steps, however, were taken in this direction 
and, as of mid-1988, no communal land district council had been granted the legal 
status of appropriate authority for wildlife.
These communal lands, and particularly those in Natural Region V, in many instances 
contain wildlife resources yielding significant safari incomes and which are also 
strategically located for the maintenance of genetically viable species-specific 
populations. They are also zones of acute human/wildlife conflict, often being located on 
the boundaries of national parks and safari areas. At the same time they have been 
largely neglected in the development efforts of the Country, are food-deficient and in 
some instances have clearly been exploited for the benefit of national economic 
requirements. The creation of the Kariba Dam to provide hydroelectric power for national 
industrial and urban requirements, displacing local Tonga from their alluvial agricultural 
land along the Zambezi floodplain, is the most striking example. The displaced Tonga 
derived little, if any, benefit to offset the costs to them of this event. A situation in which 
the proceeds from wildlife in these communal lands do not return to their place of origin 
can only replicate this example in its exploitative dimensions.
In an initial attempt to address the issues involved, NPWM introduced in 1978 a 
programme designated 'WINDFALL" (Wildlife Industries New Development for All). The 
basic assumption behind Windfall was that human/wildlife conflict would be reduced and 
attitudes towards conservation improved in affected communal lands if wildlife proceeds 
were returned to their source of origin. This was to be done by making meat from culls 
in adjacent National Parks Estate available to local inhabitants, and by returning 
revenues from safari hunting to the relevant district councils. In the event WINDFALL 
largely failed to achieve its objectives. Little meat found its way back to local 
communities and only a small proportion of the proceeds survived the attrition of the 
multi-staged route of bureaucratic accountancy it had to travel before returning to local 
district councils, let alone to originating communities. An even more fundamental 
deficiency in WINDFALL was its failure to generate local participation in decision-making 
and a sense of local-level proprietorship. The little in the way of revenues which did find 
its way back to source communities was regarded as a government handout, conveying 




Policy Initiatives in the 1980s
Aware of the deficiencies of WINDFALL and encouraged by the new Government of 
Zimbabwe's ideological and policy commitment to localised planning and 
implementation in the development process, NPWM produced in 1984 a new 
programme entitled "CAMPFIRE" (Communal Lands Management Programme for 
Indigenous Resources). Detailed in a 110-page document5, the CAMPFIRE programme 
is consistent with Government's policy stance on decentralised planning and 
management, as evidenced by the President's Address to Parliament of 24th June, 
1987, which contains the statement: "With regard to wildlife management, it is my 
Government's intention to extend this responsibility to the communal people through 
the introduction of management of indigenous resources." It is also consistent with 
current Zimbabwean policy directions on environmental conservation which have as their 
central premise the insight that' this is only viable when it is undertaken by relevant 
populations as an investment in a sustained programme of resource exploitation. They 
have the further insight that the "relevant populations" are those who live within the 
micro-environments which sustain the natural resources concerned, who pay the price 
for their sustained maintenance6, who must reap the benefits of this investment, and 
who, at the smallest viable operational level, have the collective capacity to manage 
these resources. The CAMPFIRE programme is thus essentially utilitarian in its 
approach to wildlife conservation, although this does not involve a perspective implying 
that local populations have no appreciation of wildlife stemming from aesthetic or moral 
values. It reflects rather a recognition of the dynamics of economic motivation which 
necessarily impose themselves on rural populations under subsistence conditions and 
seeks to restore a localised custodianship which can give scope to the fusion of 
ecological responsibility and community interest which characterises traditional African 
cultures.
The CAMPFIRE scheme, in the words of the programme document, seeks to:
- obtain the voluntary participation of communities in a flexible programme which 
incorporates long term solutions to resources problems;
- introduce a system of group ownership with defined rights o f access to natural 
resources for the communities resident in the target areas;
- provide the appropriate institutions under which resources can be legitimately 
managed and exploited by the resident communities for their own direct benefit;
- provide technical and financial assistance to communities which join the 
programme to enable them to realise these objectives7.
5 Martin, 1986.
6 The price paid for maintenance of wildlife populations in communal areas by local inhabitants is 
significant. It involves the allocation of land for the purpose and annual crop losses to marauding 
species. It also includes the possibility of injury or death caused by dangerous animals, a 
possibility which in some contexts is very real. In one community of sixty households currently 
being studied in the CASS programme, ten injuries and three deaths have been caused by 
buffalo and elephant in the past three years.
7 Martin, 1986:10.
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The "system o f ownership" envisaged involves the creation of locally-based natural 
resource co-operatives with essentially the same rights and obligations as the private 
owners of commercial ranches, all inhabitants of the community being shareholders. 
Profits from the enterprise may, at the discretion of the community, be used for 
communal benefits or dispersed to individual shareholders. For the programme to be 
implemented, the community (or natural resource co-operative) would have to obtain 
legal proprietorship of wildlife and other resources, and would have to develop the 
necessary management structures and strategies. To assist communities in these tasks 
the programme proposes the establishment of an implementing agency operated by 
Government.
Clearly the implementation of such a programme requires the careful Orchestration of 
complex detail, and much of the programme document's 110 pages are devoted to this 
orchestration. Some supporters of the programme have suggested that the document is 
too detailed in this respect, making it difficult to present to target communities. This 
aside, the programme is impressive in its bold response to the problems produced by 
past policy and its sensitivity to the broad range of social, economic and ecological 
factors involved. It has been cited in international circles as a model approach to the 
communal management of wildlife, and within Zimbabwe has broad public support at the 
highest levels. This notwithstanding, the position in mid-1988, four years after its 
announcement, was that no CAMPFIRE agency was in place, and no specific instance 
of a district council implementation of the scheme could be cited. The CAMPFIRE 
proposals appeared to be trapped in a rictus of bureaucratic inertia, attracting general 
endorsement but little in the way of formal implementation. Part of the reason for this 
could be attributed to the organisational complexities mentioned above, but there were 
more fundamental and unresolved conflicts of interest and perspective which lay at the 
heart of the impasse.
This impasse was broken in dramatic fashion in November, 1988, when two district 
councils, Guruve and Nyaminyami, were given "appropriate authority" status over the 
wildlife resources in the areas of their jurisdiction by the Minister of Natural Resources 
and Tourism. This status empowered these district councils to, subject to quota 
restrictions imposed by Government, determine schemes of utilisation for their wildlife, 
set up their own enterprises and enter into contracts with private organisations for this 
purpose, receive all revenues directly and disperse these revenues at their discretion. 
Responsibility for problem animal control, law enforcement and the protection of the 
resource also accrued to them. The result in both districts has been intense local 
interest and organisational activity, the creation of numerous community wildlife 
committees, increased cropping for local meat consumption on authorised and 
sustainable lines and greatly augmented district incomes from wildlife, anticipated to be 
in the magnitude of approximately ZWD 500,000 (five hundred thousand Zimbabwe 
dollars) in each district. Fuelled by these developments other district councils in the 
Country have actively pursued plans to similarly obtain appropriate authority status in 
1990. A CAMPFIRE Association of Rural Communities was formed by participating 
district councils in August* of 1989 and an NPWM report lists 26 district council or 
community wildlife projects in the planning or implementation stages during the year8.
The reason for this dramatic turn-around in the fortunes of the CAMPFIRE programme 
can be stated succinctly as a coalescence of administrative resolve, political imperative 
and judicious extension support. With a supportive national policy on decentralisation
8 Zimbabwe Government, 1989.
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and suitable legislative instruments, Zimbabwe was fortunate in having an administration 
in its Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management and its Ministry of Natural 
Resources and Tourism with the resolve to actually implement policy and the courage to 
experiment in a genuine collaboration with district councils in wildlife management. This 
coincided with a growing pressure at district and community levels to assert claims over 
local resources, claims which previously had rested more on form than substance. 
Finally, a coalition of local non-governmental organisations, sensitive to local initiatives, 
provided carefully orchestrated extension support in close collaboration with NPWM and 
district councils, the emphasis being on the enhancement of local management 
capacities rather than donor aid.
The year 1989, therefore, provided a success story. It is, however, a success story 
which must be qualified in two respects. Firstly, it relates to an evolving programme 
which will bring with it its own set of problems and competing interests. Secondly, the 
factors in success mentioned above are paralleled by issues and constraints which 
inhibited the rapid implementation of CAMPFIRE in the first instance and which will 
continue to be factors in its evolution. It is to these issues and constraints which this 
chapter turns in the sections which follow. They are analysed within the Zimbabwean 
context but can to a larger extent be generalised to other countries in eastern and 
southern Africa. A further factor, outside the scope of this chapter, deserves mention. 
This is the involvement of these countries in a large international network of current 
environmental concerns. This involvement can have positive dimensions, providing 
valuable regional collaboration, international assistance and insights. It can also be 
negative, producing direct or indirect constraints on national initiatives and in its worst 
form becoming a type of environmental neo-imperialism seeking to impose an 
environmental ethos neither relevant to African needs nor consistent with African cultural 
perspectives.
Land Use Strategies
Enthusiastic public support at the highest level for policies of decentralised management 
of natural resources has tended to mask the fact that there are in effect at the national 
level three "lobbies" regarding the allocation of land for wildlife exploitation in the 
communal lands situated in Natural Regions IV and V. The first of these, the "wildlife 
lobby", has a heterogeneous constituency' involving a spectrum of support which 
includes sentimental conseryationism, safari operator interests and those who believe 
that wildlife provides the best, most economically efficient and ecologically rational form 
of land usage for large areas in these communal lands. A second, "agricultural", lobby 
disputes this, arguing that with improved technologies of crop production and the 
introduction of suitable crop varieties, arable agricultural production will become not only 
viable but economically more productive. Alternatively, there are those holding this 
perspective who suggest that, with the eradication of tsetse fly, cattle production will be a 
more rational use of this land. This lobby has strong support in certajn international aid 
agencies which have funded tsetse fly eradication programmes and regional schemes of 
agricultural development and, therefore, have a vested interest in the perspective 
involved. It also draws support from agricultural extension agencies, which have the 
best on-the-ground extension networks in these communal lands. Finally, there is a 
third, "resettlement" lobby which allies itself with the second, but for different reasons. 
This lobby draws its motivation from national political considerations, in its more extreme 
mode being a form of political expediency and seeing these communal lands, with their 
low population densities (typically 5-10 persons per. square kilometre) as a convenient
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dumping ground for the resettlement of persons living in the overcrowded communal 
lands in the middle and highveld. Ironically, this lobby finds allies in the commercial 
farming and industrial sector which finds this a convenient solution to demands for land 
reform and to the post-employment retirement requirements of wage labourers9, and 
also finds allies among some bureaucrat guardians of the national estate who see it as a 
mechanism to divert pressure away from demands for this type of land.
The perspectives involved in these conflicting views do not, of course, necessarily imply 
mutually exclusive options for land use10, nor would their proponents claim this. They 
do, however, imply a basic conflict in policy direction, the evolved resolution of which will 
determine land use strategy and progressively close off alternative options. This is 
particularly the case if the agricultural /  resettlement option prevails, an option which is 
likely to exhibit a uni-linear and irreversible trajectory.
Analysts emphasising the weight of political imperatives are likely to predict that the 
resettlement option will probably prevail not only because of any intrinsic arguments 
which can be adduced in its favour but also because of its response to political 
expediency. It is, however, simplistic to suggest that governments anywhere, and in 
Africa specifically, act solely from imperatives of short-term political expediency. They do 
not, as the record of Zimbabwean Government policies since 1980 can amply 
demonstrate. What is required, however, at the present juncture if short-term political 
imperatives are to be balanced by rational long-term land use considerations, is a more 
definitive comparative analysis of the costs and benefits of wildlife exploitation strategies, 
set against the economic potential and long-term effects of other options. Such a 
definitive analysis is not currently available, and its execution must rank high on the 
agenda of the research programmes involved11.
The Hierarchy of Competing Interest and Authority
Devolution of wildlife proprietorship in Zimbabwe must run a gamut of relevant interest 
and authority modalities in the centre-periphery administrative hierarchy. The spectrum 
represented by this hierarchy runs from central government to the communal land 
inhabitant. Factors impinging on the strategies of this last polarity, the peasant farmer or 
household, are discussed in the next section. This section deals with the three levels of 
administrative structure which stand above the household and which separately and in'
9 CASS has recently conducted a survey among the 20,000 plus immigrants into the Zambezi 
Valley since 1980; Twenty-six percent of the new settlers have come to the Valley from wage 
employment; seventy percent from other communal lands.
10 Multi-species regimes of grazing, involving livestock and wildlife, are among the potential 
options. These are being investigated by a current W W F research project
11 There is a growing body of research results in Zimbabwe which addresses this issue and which 
suggests high values for wildlife modes of marginal land utilisation, typically in the range of eight 
to ten [dollars per hectare per annum. Depending on environmental context, this can mean 
incomes several times as great as current cash incomes from cotton cropping for the populations 
involved, as our current collaborative research with the VWVF research team shows. The fact that 
many commercial ranchers have shifted from cattle to wildlife is also strong presumptive 
evidence for the strength of the wildlife option. These examples do not, however, adequately 
compare the efficiency of this option with that of others projected under conditions of small-scale 
peasant agricultural production, in part because the arguments put forward by the "agricultural 
lobby" are themselves data-deficient and presumptive.
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their relationships with each other critically determine the options which the household 
has available. These three levels are: a) central government, in both its policy-making 
and its executive functions, administered through relevant ministries; b) the district 
councils, which in terms of the District Councils Act (amended 1980) have wide-ranging 
powers and responsibilities to administer the assets of communal lands for the benefit of 
their inhabitants; and c) the WADCO (Ward Development Committee) with similar but 
more restricted authority to further the interests of the inhabitants of the ward. Each 
WADCO has representation on the district council through its chairman, who with other 
WADCO chairmen are the councillors. Putatively, the ward is comprised of 10,000 
inhabitants; in conditions typical of communal lands in Region V, it is more likely to 
contain 2,000 to 3,000 people living on a geographically defined and usually traditionally 
legitimated land base of anywhere from 200 to 500 square kilometres. Given the 
particular characteristics of the wildlife resources, it is likely to be the smallest viable unit 
for wildlife management, and then only under particularly favourable conditions.
Clearly the inter-relationships between central government, district council and ward are 
complex, involving different perspectives, spheres of responsibility and competencies. 
For the sake of brevity, this section focuses only on one characteristic common to them 
all, which is the bureaucratic impulse to maintain authority. Policies of devolution 
typically produce a tendency to preserve authority and its benefits at each level in the 
hierarchy. The issue of the devolution of wildlife proprietorship produces no exception to 
this generalisation, as can be illustrated by the record on the distribution of wildlife 
revenues under the WINDFALL schemes. This record produces statistics shown below 
in tabular form for revenues generated from wildlife in communal lands, and 
disbursements made to district councils.
Year(s) Revenue Disbursements to 
Councils
Disbursements
1981-1984 $ 610,000 $220,000 36%
1985 $ 820,000 $260,000 32%
1986 $1,500,000 $530,000 35%
Without going into the reasons for, and the implications of, this retention of revenues by 
central Government, the point is made here that the benefits to the central bureaucracy 
derived from this are a powerful disincentive to promote a system of devolution in which 
these revenues are paid directly to district councils or wards. District councils are aware 
of the situation and are becoming increasingly aggressive in their attempts to extend 
their authority in the wildlife sphere.
Interactions between district councils and WADCOs show similar characteristics. 
Typically, such districts incorporate communal areas with high population densities and 
little wildlife and also others with low human populations but with rich wildlife resources. 
Thus these councils are dominated by councillors from wards which neither produce nor 
pay the price for wildlife revenues and tend in their allocative policies to appropriate the 
revenues of the wards that do. This creates suspicion and mistrust in the wildlife-rich 
but developmentally backward wards, coupled with a strong resistance to council 
involvement in resource management at the ward level. In one recent ward-level 
discussion on the issue, this perspective was put starkly to us by a ward authority. 
"Council," he said flatly, "is a thief. It takes our revenues away from us with one hand 
and offers nothing but food-for-work drought relief handouts with the other." Again,
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without going into the implications of this for the maintenance of dependency 
relationships, it is clear from our research that the perceived lack of return of dividends is 
the most important factor in negative attitudes to wildlife at the ward level, more 
important than the investment costs mentioned earlier12. It is equally clear that access 
to wildlife revenues by councils is a powerful disincentive to the further devolution of 
proprietorship to ward levels.
Distributive Targets and Structures
Basically, this is the issue of what form dividends should take, and whether they should 
be targeted at the farmer/household or the "community", equated for the purposes of 
this discussion as the ward. The issue is an important determinant for the coalescence 
of grass-roots motivational resolve which is a necessary dynamic in the CAMPFIRE 
concept, and a critically important one when circumstances require some form of 
compromise between cattle and wildlife utilisation.
In Zimbabwe, as in most of Africa, the basic production and consumption unit in peasant 
agriculture is the household. Even under conditions of communal land tenure, the 
household carries out its arable agricultural activities on land to which it has exclusive 
and permanent access in practical terms. Thus the linkage between the resource base, 
labour and capital inputs, yield and income, is tight and explicit and provides a strong 
motivation for efficient and energetic labour and management practices. During the 
colonial period this security of access was often breached by forced relocation; in the 
post-1980 context the subjective perceptions of permanence of tenure has re- 
established itself and, together with improvements in agricultural extension, agricultural 
credit facilities and market conditions, has largely been responsible for the dramatic 
successes achieved by communal land agriculture. Production and income is, in effect, 
'privatised1 to the household level with generally effective results, even if it is attended by 
the consequence of inequality between household incomes.
Arable production is not, however, the only activity in most peasant farming systems in 
Zimbabwe. Cattle are an important component, providing draft power, manure, milk and 
meat, and studies show a clear positive correlation between cattle ownership, arable 
yields and household incomes. Cattle ownership is also privatised to household and 
individual levels and cattle constitute for most households the most important movable 
capital asset, capable of being bought, sold, used, loaned or borrowed. The resource 
base required for cattle ownership is, however, different than the privatised access to 
land necessary for arable activities. This resource base, the grazing commonage, is a 
communal asset to which the household shares access with other households in the 
community. This use of common property for private production creates its own set of 
problems, familiar to students of the "commons" debate. Discussion on the issues 
involved is, however, beyond the scope of this chapter; the point being made here is that 
household evaluations of any proposed production scheme will largely be determined in 
terms of its perceived effects on the household's two major items of productive capital, its 
lands and its cattle. This holds true even for the inhabitants in the communal lands 
which are the focus of this chapter and where, until recently, cattle ownership has been 
precluded by the presence of tsetse fly. These populations are fully aware of the benefits
12 This is a critical issue in programme implementation. Wards which have received wildlife 
revenues from council show markedly different perspectives on wildlife issues, a fact which our 
research can demonstrate both descriptively and statistically.
8
of cattle ownership and any proposals which restrict or preclude this ownership will have, 
for acceptance, to demonstrate direct benefit returns at the household level equal to or 
exceeding those anticipated from cattle.
This implies a system of shares and dividends targeted at the household level, a form of 
corporate communal capitalism envisaged in the CAMPFIRE project document but 
muted in most promotional discussion by its proponents. Returns to the community for 
communal projects have been emphasised instead. Households are not unaware of the 
benefits of such a step in terms of an increased range of services (schools, clinics, 
grinding mils, improved roads) made available at little or not cost to themselves. In my 
view, however, this can only be regarded, in terms of motivational dynamics, as an 
interim inducement to programme implementation, carrying with it the promise of a 
further devolution of distributive benefit in the form of direct income to households.
Issues of Scale. Management and Phasing
Given the particular nature of wildlife resources, viable management strategies for 
sustained exploitation often require a territorial base larger than that which wards have 
available: Furthermore, an ecologically sound determination of this territorial base may 
conflict with ward or even district boundaries. These considerations suggest a 
necessary compromise in many instances between social and ecological criteria, 
possibly including new structures of coalition between wards and between districts.
Scale is also a factor in the management issues involved. There are, of course, several 
modes of wildlife utilisation available, all which need to be explored and none of which 
should be relied on exclusively. Currently, however, the most economically productive 
mode of exploitation, in terms of cash returns, is safari hunting. At present the 
management skills necessary for this industry are a monopoly of entrepreneurial 
professionals. Wards and districts interested in managing their wildlife resources would 
like to capture net profits currently going to these operators, but none possess at this 
point in time either the managerial skills and experiences or the capital required to 
mount safari operations of their own. A phased transmission of managerial capacities is, 
therefore, required, councils and wards negotiating transitional contracts with safari 
operators from a position of strength as legal proprietors of the resource. Some 
progress on this front is already in evidence. NPWM is now awarding safari concessions 
on communal lands only after taking advice from district councils, and district councils 
with appropriate authority status make their own decisions on this matter. Some safari 
operators have, as a consequence, been excluded from these contracts and others, with 
a prescience concerning future changes in the structure of proprietorship, have begun to 
consider the possibility of acting as employees of councils, filling dual management and 
training roles.
Phasing stratagems are also relevant to the issue of appropriate levels of devolution in 
authority and benefit. This analysis has implied a case for the devolution of authority for 
wildlife to the ward level in most instances, and for devolution of distributive benefits to 
the household level, again in most instances. Even if these arguments are accepted, it 
can be suggested that these objectives are best achieved in a series of progressive 
stages. There are counter-arguments to this position, and the most effective stratagems 
are likely to be those which are tailor-made to suit specific contexts. The contexts in 
which wildlife management schemes in Zimbabwe's communal lands can be 
implemented provide a broad spectrum of circumstances in respect to the scale and
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nature of the resource base, socio-economic conditions and levels of capacity for self­
management Strategies for implementation should, therefore, not be over-generalised. 
Furthermore, they should be flexible and adaptable to unanticipated developments. 
Schemes for the decentralised proprietorship of wildlife resource in Zimbabwe are, like 
most development plans, not immutable and are likely to routinely change in their 
context and direction. They are, in effect, experiments in socio-ecological engineering, 
the success or failure of whicjjJs dependent as much on their bapacity to adjust to 
evolving realities as on the competence of their original planning.
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